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Public Diplomacy in the European Union:  
Models for Poland 
Beata Ociepka1 
Diplomacy has been changing dramatically in recent years as a result of an adjustment to more 
interconnected and hybrid international relations. One of the signs of this change is more stress put on 
soft-power tools as public diplomacy. Classic diplomacy has shifted from the domain of politics to the 
public sphere, where public opinion is formed.  Formerly latent diplomacy has become public diplomacy 
with the effect of a more symmetric conduct of international political communication. Poland’s public 
diplomacy is conditioned by the country’s size and its status as a “new” EU Member State, but there 
are lessons to be learned from strategies adopted by other countries in the European Union, 
particularly in the fields of culture, development aid, and education. 
The Member States of the EU are well advanced in the implementation of public diplomacy in their foreign 
policy strategies and nowadays the European Union also has a Unit for Public Diplomacy and Election 
Observation within the new structure of the EEAS. Thus, whereas the EU aims the majority of its efforts at 
public diplomacy with its own members, the member countries have a long tradition of reaching out to 
their regions of interest first with cultural diplomacy, then also with public diplomacy.   
The differences in the use of soft-power2 tools among the countries in Europe are significant and might be 
relevant for relative newcomers in the field, such as Poland. France has the longest tradition of establishing 
institutions for cultural diplomacy, such as Alliance Francaise in 1883. Germany combines cultural and 
economic diplomacy under the umbrella of its so called foreign image policy. Great Britain attracted 
attention, including that of researchers, in the nineties when it introduced modernity into its traditionally 
conservative image, and consequently rebranded the country. For Germany and Great Britain, big sport 
events (the 2006 FIFA World Cup and 2012 Olympic Games, respectively) were milestones in their public 
diplomacy strategies. France, Germany and the Netherlands are convinced of the need to implement public 
diplomacy to diminish the tensions between societies rooted in World War II. Nordic and Scandinavian 
countries provide an example for positive soft-power effects of development aid programmes.  Many 
European countries, including the three big members mentioned above but also the smaller Netherlands, 
have enhanced their position by resting on the attractive power of science and higher education. However, 
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it should not be overlooked that many European governments, including Poland, nowadays seem also to 
believe strongly in the power of images and brands and in the notion of rebranding as a tool of their soft 
power.  
Poland’s Steps into Public Diplomacy 
The Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) developed its first definitions of public diplomacy in 2000, with 
the current understanding (in 2014) focused on achieving results in public opinion with messages about 
Poland in order to build dialogical relations with the public abroad. Information on the website of the Polish 
MFA says public diplomacy is a strategic means serving to secure Polish interests globally.3 Polish public 
diplomacy is conducted by the MFA (Department of Public and Cultural Diplomacy) and other Ministries, 
coordinated by the intragovernmental Council for the Promotion of Poland, in cooperation with the Polish 
Tourist Organisation, Adam Mickiewicz Institute, and Polish Institutes abroad, as well as NGOs. 
Promotion, brand, image, and public opinion comprise the most important notions of the Polish approach 
to the use of soft power means in international relations. As Polish society, and indeed the public in 
formerly communist countries after the transition process, is overly sensitive to international perception, 
much stress has been put on images and branding as core elements of Polish public diplomacy. The most 
recent document accepted by the Council for the Promotion of Poland is focused on the “Polish brand.”  
In 2013, the MFA commissioned research on Poland’s image abroad. Meanwhile, the Ministry of Economy 
continues its public relations campaign on Poland’s economic branding.4  
This focus on public diplomacy has gained more attention in recent years. Today, it is the most important 
tool for managing Polish soft-power assets, while coordinating cultural diplomacy, including international 
broadcasting, and frequently combined with economic diplomacy. The presidency of the EU Council in 
2011 and EURO 2012 were milestones in both rebranding Poland and in the elaboration of the Polish 
approach to public diplomacy. As with other countries in Central and Eastern Europe, Poland’s efforts are 
strongly shaped by geopolitics, modelled on the Western members of the EU, and very much focused on 
branding, on the one hand, and on the politics of historical memory on the other.  
Although the logic of the implementation of public diplomacy into the foreign policy of superpowers, 
middle powers and small countries differs significantly, it is worth drawing conclusions from the 
experiences of Germany, Poland’s neighbour and most important economic partner, Great Britain, as 
possibly the most advanced country in implementing public diplomacy in Europe, and the Scandinavian and 
Nordic countries, due to their success in achieving the position of middle powers despite the low 
significance of their military assets. The Scandinavian and Nordic model rests on smart power,5 based on 
the convergence of economic welfare and soft-power assets. Their public diplomacy has been used to build 
coalitions and to influence the agenda of international relations.   
In Poland, meanwhile, the implementation of public diplomacy marks an important step in the 
modernisation of foreign policy, and at the same time means there has been acceptance of the logic of 
mediated political communication internationally.  
For Poland, Geopolitics Matters 
Poland, as with all of the new ex-communist members of the EU, is convinced of the importance of 
geopolitics in public diplomacy strategies. Geopolitics is decisive for defining target countries, the preferred 
tools of public diplomacy, and the way they are to be used. Relations with both of Poland’s large 
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neighbours—Germany and Russia—are of prime significance. On the one hand, the EU, with Germany as 
the most important partner for Poland, means the region is of prime relevance to all of the strategies for 
positioning Poland through the use of soft-power tools. On the other hand, Russian actions in its “near 
abroad” have encouraged Poland to target the Eastern Partnership countries (Ukraine being the most 
important among them) with public and cultural diplomacy efforts.  
The size of a country matters in terms of perception and its chosen public diplomacy strategy, but in the 
case of the Netherlands this is relative within, and even consciously related to its strategies. During World 
War II, the country presented itself to the American audience as “small Netherlands,” a victim of its big 
German neighbour, in order to persuade the U.S. to participate in the war. To preserve its power over 
Indonesia, the Dutch government used the concept of a “great Netherlands.”6 In 2013, the Dutch Advisory 
Committee on Modernising the Diplomatic Service found more advantages than disadvantages in the 
Netherland’s small size, claiming in a basic document on the future of Dutch diplomacy that a small 
country’s diplomacy might be open and “unconventional,” as the impact of geopolitics on a small actor is 
less relevant.7 Paradoxically, not only the Dutch but also the German government claimed that globalisation 
has rendered countries smaller.8  
Hence, being medium in size and located between Germany and Russia, Poland has, on one hand, been 
forced to make much effort to gain credibility, support, and visibility in a multipolar world, and, on the 
other, to fight with the socio-psychological, long-lasting consequences of World War II at the domestic 
level. One of the tools in the process is public diplomacy with a domestic dimension.  
The cases of Canada and Norway show that the best strategy for public diplomacy that supports a positive 
perception of small and medium-size countries is to present national politics as “serving the global good.”9 
Poland primarily strives to play the role of a good citizen of Europe (specifically in the EU), but at the same 
time, using the definition of public diplomacy from the Polish MFA presented above, it also includes the 
global dimension. A look at large European countries reveals that nowadays their governments are 
refocusing their diplomatic efforts on emerging economies, in particular the BRIC(S) countries.10 Changes in 
the targeted countries can also be observed in international broadcasting. The BBC ended its programmes 
in Polish in 2005 as necessary to establish new services in Arabic and Persian. Poland also has to decided 
again to re-select its target countries and regions for its public (and economic) diplomacy. The Arab Spring 
during the Polish presidency of the Council of the EU in 2011 proved well the necessity for reaching new 
regions with Polish soft-power tools.  Still, Poland’s international position in this case gave the country 
European but not global visibility.  
Cool Polska?  
The convergence of public and cultural diplomacy is typical for the majority of European countries with  
a long tradition of cultural diplomacy, and nowadays also for Poland. The Polish specifics rest on the 
importance of culture and history and respond well to the understanding of public diplomacy as  
a narrative11 in which societies transmit their culture abroad while using the means of cultural diplomacy 
and international communication. Poland stresses the apparent exclusion of Eastern European heritage 
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from the mainstream European memory before 1989, and thus has been engaged in reintroducing the CEE 
countries’ narrative to the European mainstream.   
Polish public diplomacy is on the way to finding a balance between presenting its tragic and glorious past 
and its successful modernisation (this dichotomy also reflects well the cleavages in Polish society). In 
associating tradition with modernisation, Poland can rest on the experiences of Great Britain. The former 
superpower managed to reshape its image, concentrated on the tradition of the British monarchy, while 
including into the key message the achievements of modern Britain in the nineties. The process is well 
described by the idea of “Cool Britain,” a notion in fashion under the government of Tony Blair. Starting 
with branding campaigns in the nineties, Britain rooted its public diplomacy after 2002 in strategic 
communication, providing it with a broader context.12 Since the end of the 20th century, more countries 
have been following the idea of combining the glorious past, thriving traditional culture, and modernity into 
their key messages. Poland should go this direction, abandoning the notion of being “cool,” as it has been 
implemented too frequently in the last 20 years (even outside Europe—“Cool Japan”), but putting stress on 
the two pillars supporting Poland in its role as a CEE regional leader: tradition and modernity.  
According to the Dutch experience of a small country building its international position on soft-power 
assets, a thriving culture contributes to economic growth, and arts and cultural exchanges are relevant 
tools of foreign policy.13 Science and education should be added to the list. While winning foreign students, 
many countries have built a network of stakeholders who have acquired their education in the country.  
Academic and student exchanges seem to be highly neglected in Polish efforts to implement public 
diplomacy. As the Spanish Elcano Global Presence Index (IEPG) shows, the Czech Republic is able to attract 
many more foreign students than Poland.14 In the UK, international students contribute more than £10 
billion to the high education market.15 Academic and student exchanges comprise an important part of 
German foreign cultural and educational policy. In Germany, there is a Unit on Science and High Schools 
within the Department of Culture and Communication, supported by the German Academic Exchange 
Service (DAAD), which is a partner of the German MFA in the conduct of foreign cultural policy.16  
Speaking to the World: The Power of Broadcasting 
France, Germany and Great Britain traditionally include international broadcasting into their models of 
public diplomacy or foreign cultural policy. Support for this comes from their history, international 
positions and in the fact that French, German and English play the role of languages of wider 
communication. Before the fall of the Iron Curtain, Poland belonged to the Soviet informational empire and 
at the same time received U.S. and Western European radio. The Velvet Revolution did not change 
Poland’s role on the informational periphery.  
A medium-size country striving to be a middle power has an opportunity to play the role of an 
informational neighbour in relation to smaller countries (in this case, to the east) and to improve its 
position in international communication while including media into democracy promotion. The main 
document on the promotion of Poland from 2009 signals the need to invest in radio and television 
broadcasting, including online service for the public abroad, but it does not define the role of international 
broadcasters in public diplomacy.17 This part of Polish public diplomacy seems to be underestimated by the 
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Polish MFA. Small and medium-size countries traditionally invest in radio for foreign audiences and radio 
and television stations for their diasporas. Nowadays, they develop these services online.  
Poland has launched radio (Radio Racja—Radio Reason and European Radio for Belarus) and television 
stations (Belsat TV) aimed at a Belarusian audience. Belsat TV, supported by the MFA and TVP (Polish 
public service television), has the aim to promote democracy while substituting for the lack of uncensored 
information sources in Belarus. Although Belsat TV should be seen as an important project of Polish public 
diplomacy, it is not coordinated by the Department of Public and Cultural Diplomacy but by the Eastern 
Department and Department of Development Cooperation in the MFA, together with representatives of 
the public service broadcaster. Belsat TV promulgates the core values of the EU, such as democracy and 
freedom of the press. Although the channel is recognised as Polish by only 13.9% of viewers,18 it maintains 
its relevance to public diplomacy purposes for the long term, which corresponds well to the symmetrical 
model of new public diplomacy. Despite its high costs, all of the political parties in Poland support the 
channel. Belsat is also supported by European middle powers Sweden and Norway, and Deutsche Welle 
from Germany, as it fits well into their understanding of democracy promotion. 
Economic Power and Its Soft Lining 
Germany illustrates the case of a country that for a long time has rested on its cultural diplomacy and 
positive perception of its products globally. In the nineties, the coordination of the two fields and the 
implementation of the country’s branding proved to be necessary. R. Hülsse called the new model 
“catwalk” diplomacy, thanks to the employment of Claudia Schiffer, the famous German supermodel, in the 
country’s branding campaigns.19 There is much evidence that small and medium-size states can achieve 
much with their public diplomacy if they have sound economies and their societies enjoy high living 
standards. Some of them, such as Sweden, have relied on the country-of-origin effect or on flagship brands, 
products and companies, such as IKEA. The living standards of Nordic and Scandinavian countries have 
contributed to their perception as middle powers as early as the turn of the eighties and nineties.  
This path can hardly be followed by small and medium-size CEE states. On the one hand, they cannot build 
their narrative on high living standards and sound economies, as they have erected their market economies 
quite recently. Poland does not have any internationally recognisable flagship products. On the other hand, 
within the EU Poland has achieved a positive image due to its economic performance since the 2008 
economic crisis began and its newly gained political stability. Soft-power assets were thus used as vehicles 
for proliferating good news about positive changes in the country. These developments might again be best 
illustrated by data from the Spanish Instituto Elcano, which shows that economic growth has had the most 
important impact on Poland’s global perception.20   
Democracy Promotion 
Middle powers are very active in development aid. Poland, as with almost all CEE countries, is a newcomer 
to development aid and democracy promotion, but both areas seem promising fields for diplomatic efforts 
and have their niches in public diplomacy. All new members of the EU are willing to share knowhow on the 
transition to democracy with the countries of the Eastern Partnership and Western Balkans, and with other 
regions, such as North Africa since 2011. In their democratisation efforts, they have been supported by the 
Nordic and Scandinavian countries, which promulgate the core ideas of European democracy themselves.  
Since the CEE EU states’ engagement in development cooperation has a short track record, it is difficult to 
state if it is functional in their public diplomacy goals. For Poland, the field seems to be promising, as the 
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vast majority of Polish society supports Polish engagement abroad.21 Some evidence might be derived from 
the British case, such as the Department for International Development, which was included into the Public 
Diplomacy Strategy Board established in 2002.22 
Promotion of democracy is one of several potential niches for Polish public diplomacy, as the Polish 
government and NGOs have joined in sharing knowhow on the transition to democracy with the Eastern 
neighbours. The Eastern Partnership is a flagship initiative of Poland within the framework of the EU’s 
European Neighbourhood Policy. Development cooperation constitutes a new specialisation, one 
potentially important for the perception of the country in the international community.  
Conclusion 
Polish public diplomacy has come of age. The realisation of its importance supports the country’s efforts to 
present itself as a reliable and stable partner and as a good citizen of the international community. The 
significant improvement in the perception of Poland in recent years is due to its stable economic growth 
despite the 2008 crisis and its predictable foreign policy since 2007. Combining these two variables with 
public diplomacy, Poland has nearly achieved a reputation as a good citizen of the European (and 
international) community and one typical of middle powers. However, Polish efforts to achieve the status of 
a regional leader with global visibility are too focused on nation-branding and images. There is still no 
strategy for Polish public diplomacy that would set the objectives and harmonise the efforts of all the actors 
in the field.  
Although the international position and role of Germany differs significantly from Poland after 1989, 
Germany’s foreign image policy and the implementation of German foreign cultural policy for conflict 
prevention might have a normative impact on Polish public diplomacy. German foreign cultural policy stands 
as the third pillar of German foreign policy, putting the stress on the soft-power assets of the country on 
the one hand, but also on the implementation of cultural diplomacy for conflict prevention, on the other.  
If Polish efforts are to achieve their objectives and not to be limited to country branding, the German 
approach might be relevant. Further work on coordination is inevitable. Nevertheless, coordination does 
not mean a need for a central body but rather a smart convergence of public, cultural and economic 
diplomacy. The inclusion of international broadcasting into the strategies of Polish promotion is a fact, and 
now it should be followed by the incorporation of it into the Department of Public and Cultural Diplomacy 
or into a new strategy of public diplomacy. Belsat TV is an exceptional project, and as such needs more 
publicity.   
Democracy promotion and development cooperation are promising fields for a future Polish public 
diplomacy strategy. The same must be said about academic exchanges and education, which at the moment 
hardly contribute to Poland’s global soft-power presence. The universities in the country are not as 
prominent as those in other European countries, but their network-building potential can no longer be 
ignored by the Polish government. Both fields would allow Poland to attract stakeholders from outside 
Europe and to gain global visibility. Investing in stipends for African students could replace the lack of Polish 
Institutes in Africa. 
As neither a big nor small European country, Poland has to define the role it strives for through an internal 
debate and achieve consensus at home on the subject—a process that illustrates the domestic dimension of 
public diplomacy.  
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